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INTRODUCTION 
T ru, ,, not ,imply ,nothec book ,bout tdigion ond violence. 
It is a book presenting a new theory for religious violence. The idea for 
the book was born long before the now well-known events of September 11, 
2001. Religious violence has preoccupied me ever since I began to ask myself 
how I could hold sacred the Bible, a book tilled with so much violence. I then 
expanded the question to how anyone today can deem sacred those books 
that endorse any level of violence. By early 2001 I had already published an 
article comparing violence in the Bible and the Bhagavad Gita. 1 
Some of my thinking was influenced by a book by Regina Schwartz, The 
Czme of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (1997).2 The author argued 
therein that monotheism was inherently violent. Since monotheism advo-
cates only one legitimate deity, then the worship of anything else is a viola-
tion of boundaries. The addition of a group of outsiders then becomes the 
prime ingredient for violence. The life of outsiders may be devalued, so 
killing them can be justified. But more intriguing was the author's allusion to 
the scarce resources created by monotheism. For example, belief in one god 
as the exclusive possession of one people may mean that outsiders are denied 
access to the benefits or rights provided by that one god. Such benefits could 
be land or national identity. 
I wondered if similar mechanisms were at work not just in monotheism, 
but in religion as a whole. I asked myself whether religion is inherently violent. 
If not, what are the mechanisms by which religion sometimes becomes violent? 
Are those factors the same as the ones that cause other types of violence? Is 
there something special about religion that makes it prone to violence? Or are 
we misperceiving religion by focusing too much on its violent side? 
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The questions seemed particularly important because there is a definite 
stream of popular opinion and scholarship that denies that religion is the 
cause of some specific conflicts or of violence in general. Shortly after the 
attack of September 11, Andrew Sullivan noted in a New York Times Maga-
zine article that "there has been a general reluctance to call it a religious 
war."3 Similarly, there have been efforts to deny that the Nazi Holocaust had 
any religious roots, some preferring to place responsibility on evolutionary 
theory or atheism. Alan Jacobs has even argued that "the whole notion of 
religion as a cause of violence is . . . a function of the desire to believe that 
religion is eliminable."4 
Along the way, I concluded that while it does not always cause violence, 
religion is inherently prone to violence.5 In fact, even so-called pacifistic reli-
gions often approve of violence in subtle ways. I saw that "peace" itself was 
simply the name for the set of conditions favorable to a proponent group 
rather than some absolute rejection of violence. Other times, "peace" was 
simply an intermediary state in which pacifism was maintained for political 
and self-interest rather than for any systematic opposition to all violence. 
But more important, I came to wonder how and why religions can be 
prone to violence. After much thought and comparison of many religions, I 
formulated what will be the main elements of my thesis, which I can summa-
rize succinctly as follows: 
1) Most violence is due to scarce resources, real or perceived. Whenever 
people perceive that there is not enough of something they value, 
conflict may ensue to maintain or acquire that resource. This can 
range from love in a family to oil on a global scale. 
2) When religion causes violence, it often does so because it has created 
new scarce resources. 
As I compared religious violence with secular violence, I also realized 
that there was a fundamental distinction between the two. Unlike many non-
religious sources of conflict, religious conflict relies solely on resources 
whose scarcity is wholly manufactured by, or reliant on, unverifiable prem-
ises. When the truth or falsity of opposing propositions cannot be verified, 
then violence becomes a common resort in adjudicating disputes. That is the 
differentia that makes religious violence even more tragic than nonreligious 
violence. 
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DEFINITIONS 
Any claim that religion is inherently prone to violence must begin with def-
initions. The first pertains to religion, which is defined here as a mode of life 
and thought that presupposes the existence of, and relationship with, unver-
ifiable forces and/or beings. As such, our definition is squarely and unapolo-
getically within the empirico-rationalist tradition. 
All definitions of violence are value laden insofar as we choose the type 
of suffering and violence we value.6 Our definition is somatocentric insofar 
as it values the physical human body and regards any sort of "soul" or "spirit" 
as nonexistent. As we will see, religions often espouse a pneumatocentric jus-
tification for violence, in which the values of the entities called the "soul" or 
"spirit" are paramount to those of the body. Accordingly, we define violence as 
the act of modifying and/or inflicting pain upon the human body in order to express 
or impose power differentials. 7 
By this definition, pain or bodily modification can be inflicted upon a 
person by others or it can be self-inflicted, as in the case of self-flagellation 
and martyrdom. There are degrees of violence, so that a haircut or a tattoo, 
both bodily modifications, are not always regarded as very violent. At the 
same time, our definition allows for the fact that depilation and tattooing can 
be painful forms of torture.8 Likewise, circumcision could be subsumed 
under violence in that it modifies a body for the purpose of expressing power 
differentials. Circumcision also imposes a power differential upon a child, as 
it is not the result of a mutual decision between parent and child. Killing, of 
course, is regarded as the ultimate imposition of a power differential on the 
body. 
Since we regard mental processes as part of the body, then psychological 
and mental violence is included in our somatocentric approach. Psycholog-
ical torture, for example, involves physiological changes in the body, and pain 
is ultimately how we experience certain neurochemical events. As long as an 
action relating to the expression of power modifies or inflicts pain upon a 
physical body, it is defined as violent, whether such injury is justified or not. 
It is important to note that war is one of many forms of violence. The 
focus on "war," if defined as an armed conflict between collective entities, 
results in the thesis that religion and specific religions are not violent because 
they do not often engage in war.9 This has been a particularly recurrent 
problem in evaluating early Christianity, as often being against military 
service is equated with being nonviolent. And there is evidence that even in 
self-described "pacifist" groups the incidence of domestic and sexual violence 
reported can be just as high as among the general population. 10 Ours is a 
more holistic approach because we realize that much religious violence does 
not come in the form of the large and organized effort we may associate with 
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war. Examples of religious violence range from circumcision to killing gays 
and lesbians. 
We recognize, but do not treat, "verbal" violence here except when it is 
a clear precursor to actual physical violence. Violence does include the 
destruction of property when that is an instrument to cause harm to the 
livelihood or sociopsychological welfare of any individual or community. 11 
One such example is Kristallnacht (1938), when German Jews were terror-
ized by the destruction of their property even, if outright killing of]ews was 
not yet at its height in Nazi Germany. 
Under our concept of violence, we can also distinguish between justified 
and unjustified violence. Violence in self-defense or the defense of the phys-
ical well-being of others is acceptable. The surgical modification of the body 
for the purposes of saving a life or empowering an individual, especially if the 
individual chose to be so modified, is justified violence. We hold any violence 
that is not based on verifiable causes and phenomena to be senseless and 
unethical. We will outline this argument at greater length in chapter 15. 
Beating a child or stoning a woman to death is not acceptable violence, 
regardless of the reason. We certainly do not advocate that physical injury or 
killing someone's body is ever justified to serve some greater spiritual good. 
CAUSALI1Y AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
Since at least the time of David Hume ( 1711-177 6), the notion of causality 
has undergone severe scrutiny. David Hume proposed that spatial and tem-
poral contiguity did not constitute logical proof of causation. 12 What we call 
a "cause" is actually better described as a correlation that occurs in time and 
space between two or more events. At most, we could speak of correlations, 
wherein we observe that one event regularly followed temporally upon 
another. 
Within history, the notion of cause has produced a crisis that is still 
underway. What would it mean to claim, for example, that Ronald Reagan's 
policies "caused" the fall of communism? Unlike many correlations found in 
nature, historical events are not usually repeatable under exactly the same 
circumstances. Even if there were correlations, these cannot always be seen 
as a "cause" any more than the correlation of a rooster crowing before sun-
rise means that the rooster's crow caused the sun to rise. 
Within the study of war, the crisis of determining causality can be seen 
in the mammoth project known as the Correlates of War (COW), which 
seeks to find what factors can be correlated with wars. Frank Whelan 
Wayman and J. David Singer, one of the founders of the COW Project, are 
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reticent to speak of causes. They see the COW Project as "searching for vari-
ables that are positively correlated with the onset of war, and ascertaining 
whether the association seems causal."13 Nonetheless, Wayman and Singer 
propose at least three requirements for establishing causality, which can be 
summarized as follows: 14 
1. A postulated cause has to precede the effect in time (or at least occur 
simultaneously with it rather than come after it). 
2. The cause and effect have to covary as demonstrated by a statistical 
correlation. 
3. Other explanations of the cause and effect relationship have to be 
eliminated. 14 
So what does it mean to say that religion "causes" violence or "can 
cause" violence? Here we opt for a definition of"cause" that can demonstrate 
a logical sequence as well as a spatiotemporal one. We may say that religion 
causes violence if and when the perpetration of violence is a logical consequence of 
beliefs in unverifiable forces and/or beings. The expression "logical conse-
quence" can be represented in a more formal manner: Religious Belief X, 
therefore Act of Violence Y. 15 Accordingly, attribution of religious causation 
requires demonstration that an act of violence had a necessary precedent in 
a religious belief. Without that causational belief, the specific act of violence 
would not have taken place. 
For example, suppose person A truly believes that God has commanded 
him to kill homosexuals, and this person then kills a homosexual. In this case, 
we can say that belief X (God has commanded person A to kill homosexuals) 
caused the killing of the homosexual. In such a case, we may say that the reli-
gious belief was necessary, if not sufficient, to perpetrate this act of violence. 
In the clearest cases, the perpetrators may themselves cite such beliefs. 
Most acts of religious violence are not so transparent. This has led 
scholars to posit political and economic factors as the main causes of many 
common conflicts. And indeed political and economic factors can also lead to 
violence. However, the notion of causation would be no less severe for 
positing economic and political factors, and, in fact, they may be even more 
elusive as causes. Disentangling the religious from other causes forms a main 
challenge for our thesis. 
It is, indeed, also useful to make the distinction between necessary and 
sufficient causes. Some violence would not occur if certain religious beliefs 
did not exist. For example, the idea that homosexuality is evil may be neces-
sary, but not sufficient, to explain a particular act of antigay violence. Our 
study will include acts of violence for which religion forms a necessary 
and/or sufficient basis for the violence. 
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Accordingly, the reader must realize that our thesis does not claim that reli-
gion is the cause of all violence. We certainly recognize that poverty, politics, 
nationalism, and even neuropsychological factors may generate violence. 
Nor do we necessarily claim that most violence is religious, as statistical ver-
ification is very difficult, especially for ancient history. We also recognize that 
within religions there may be a plurality of positions on violence, though we 
shall show that some descriptions of religions as peaceful rely on faulty data 
or lack of acquaintance with primary sources. 
Our thesis proposes that when religion causes violence, it usually does so 
because it has created a scarce resource. The creation of scarce resources may 
occur when the adherents of a religion claim that the benefits of that religion 
are not or cannot be equally distributed to all human beings. Accordingly, we 
must also extend our argument to include scarcity in the chain of causation. 
We acknowledge that religion can also cause violence through means other 
than the creation of scarce resources, and we will outline some of those as we 
examine specific cases of religious violence. 
A resource is any entity that persons utilize in the enterprise of living. 
Not all resources are of equal value, of course. One can live without a Rolex 
watch. We focus on those resources that are of high value, or at least of a 
value high enough to fight for. A resource may be described as scarce when 
it meets one or more of the following requirements: (1) It is not immediately 
available, and (2) accessing it, maintaining it, or acquiring it requires the 
expense of a significant amount of social or physical capital and labor. A 
scarce resource X created by religion may cause violence when at least one 
of two or more persons or groups (1) desires to acquire or maintain X, and (2) 
believes violence is an allowable and proper method to acquire and/or maintain X. 
Demonstration of our thesis consists of at least two main types of evi-
dence. The first centers on the words of perpetrators of violence them-
selves. Too often in debates about religion and conflict, the attribution of 
motives is based on secondary sources or faulty deductions. The COW Pro-
ject, for example, usually does not focus on statements made by perpetrators 
of violence. One example of a clear attribution of violence to religious rea-
sons can be seen in the following Hadith reported by Al-Bukhari, perhaps 
the most authoritative collector of traditions about Muhammad. Al-Bukhari 
tells us: 
The prophet said, "Allah ... assigns for a person who participates in ~holy 
battles) in Allah's Cause and nothing causes him to do so except belief m 
Allah and in His Messenger, that he will be recompensed by Allah with a 
reward, or booty (if he survives) or will be admitted to Paradise (if he is 
killed in the battle as a martyr)." 16 
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Here is a clear attribution of the reason for violence from a Muslim himself. 
This sort of self-attribution by practitioners of a religion certainly would 
count as strong evidence that violence was the result of religious beliefs. 
A second type of demonstration involves logical deductions, which allow 
us to make clear cases of a belief leading to an action much as described 
above. Again, we pursue examples in which we can reduce the act of violence 
to the following rationale: Religious Belief X, therefore Act of Violence Y. If we 
return to our example of violence against homosexuals, we can infer a reli-
gious reason when a person who commits an act of violence against a homo-
sexual has only previously expressed religious reasons for hating homosex-
uals. In such a case, we need not necessarily hear him utter religious reasons 
at the time he commits an act of violence, nor do we need to hear him 
threaten an act of violence to make a reasonable inference that religion was 
probably the likely "cause." 
We are also fortunate to have at least a bit of empirical survey data that 
allows us to correlate religiosity with certain beliefs about the value of 
Jerusalem and other sacred spaces that are important in our argumentation. 
One such example is the survey conducted by Jerome M. Segal, Shlomit 
Levy, N adar Izzat Sa 'id, and Elihu Katz. 17 We will also discuss studies on the 
correlation between religious belief and militarism undertaken by sociolo-
gists of religion. 18 
Likewise, we concentrate on cases in which economics and politics can 
be shown to derive from religious factors rather than the reverse. In sum, we 
will count our thesis successful by providing examples of violence that would 
probably not have occurred if a religious belief were not involved or where 
we can show that religious motives are expressly used to incite or maintain 
violence. 
VIOLENCE AND ACADEMIC RELIGIOUS STUDIES 
Our main claim here is that academic biblical scholars and scholars of reli-
gion, more often than not, maintain the value of religious texts that promote 
or endorse violence. This maintenance is accomplished by hermeneutic 
strategies that sanitize the violence, claim to espouse multivocality in read-
ings, or claim aesthetic value to texts even if historical aspects of the texts are 
minimized. In this regard, we are influenced by theories that see the aca-
demic study of literature itself as a locus and instrument of power. 19 
Most of us are influenced by our training and life experience in formu-
lating any theory. In the interest of openness and self-analysis, I provide a 
brief narrative about some of the recurrent issues that I see among academics 
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who attempt to address the problem of violence in religion. Briefly, these 
issues are: (1) the perceived public mission of religious studies; (2) the pres-
ence of cryptoessentialism in religious studies; and (3) the place of empirico-
rationalism and naturalism in religious studies. 
The first problem revolves around the perceived mission of religious 
studies, particularly in secular institutions of higher learning. Noam 
Chomsky argued cogently during the Vietnam War that "it is the responsi-
bility of intellectuals to speak truth and to expose lies."20 
However, since public universities are funded by taxpayers, the mission 
of religious studies is perceived to mean that scholars must be sympathetic or 
neutral toward religion. Religions must be understood but not criticized. 
Any research indicating that religion is injurious or that particular religions 
are injurious can bring a response that universities, as publicly funded insti-
tutions, cannot seek to undermine the faith of constituents. 
Otherwise, the notion of academic responsibility has not been consistent 
from field to field. Professors in the sciences, for example, routinely are 
expected to help solve problems in society, whether these be finding a new 
medication for cancer or learning how to suppress odor produced by swine 
containment facilities. This is particularly the case in so-called land grant 
universities, which are expected to be involved directly in the betterment of 
the society around them. In the case of science, academics are encouraged to 
identify a "problem" and then help to solve it. 
From time to time, there have been efforts to engage in what is called 
"activist" scholarship, or "praxis." This sometimes means that advocates of 
some sort of liberation theology see their obligation, as scholars, as putting 
their beliefs into practice. We have seen this with all sorts of liberation the-
ology movements in Latin America and in the United States. In South Africa 
there were some vocal theoreticians of this approach when apartheid ruled. 
For example, Gregory Baum says, "religious studies, and the human sciences 
in general, should not only aim at understanding reality, but also at trans-
forming it."21 
In truth, neutrality does not and cannot exist in the academic study of 
religion, even if it can be minimized in the teaching about religion in a plu-
ralistic society. The nonneutrality of academic attitudes toward religion can 
be traced to at least Thomas Jefferson's vision of the first public university in 
the United States, the University of Virginia. Outlining a radical departure 
from earlier American colleges, Thomas Jefferson decided that theology 
would not be taught in his university. In a letter dated November 22, 1822 , 
Jefferson told his friend Thomas Cooper, "In our university ... there is no 
Professorship of Divinity. A handle has been made of this, to disseminate an 
idea that this is an institution, not merely of no religion, but against all reli-
gion."22 
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Jefferson actually would permit sects to fund their own professorships 
and be housed near enough so that students could go listen to their lectures. 
However, Jefferson insisted that these professorships should "maintain their 
independence of us and of each other. "23 His agenda in having these sectarian 
professorships interact with students at the University of Virginia was, in 
part, "to neutralize their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion 
of peace, reason, and morality."24 
And, indeed, despite the complaints of creationists, science departments 
have very little problem teaching evolution as a fact. Evolution certainly 
undermines Christian literalistic understandings of Genesis, but those 
understandings are either held not to be suitable understandings of Chris-
tianity, or they have so little power that they can be ignored. Nor do univer-
sities have a problem teaching a heliocentric vision of the universe even if a 
few constituents still think it undermines their religious belief. Truth here is 
held to be so obvious that a religious understanding may be excluded as legit-
imate. Here the results of empirico-rationalist science are held to take prece-
dence over offending religious beliefs. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, bitter battles were fought over the 
advent of higher criticism, which undermined belief in the historicity of 
many parts of the Bible.25 Among the first portions of the Bible to be sub-
mitted to close scrutiny was the Pentateuch. The main issues revolved 
around the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Eventually, most critical 
scholars rejected the idea that one person had written the whole Pentateuch. 
The other issue revolved around the historicity of the stories in Genesis, 
especially the creation stories. Eventually, geology and astronomy led 
scholars away from literal interpretations of Genesis, and those stories were 
reclassified as "myth." 
The New Testament also came under fire. The publication of H. S. 
Reimarus's fragments in 1768 is usually taken as a benchmark date for 
research that systematically questioned the historicity of Jesus. 26 Reimarus 
argued that Jesus was a failed revolutionary whose disciples refused to admit 
his death. Thus, a story developed that Jesus would resurrect and return tri-
umphantly to set up his kingdom. 
Likewise, battles with the so-called fundamentalists were waged in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with a clear secularizing trend 
that undermined the religious views of many in the United States. George 
M. Marsden, writing from a Protestant perspective, wrote The Soul of the 
American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief 
(1994),27 which charted some of the secularizing trends. Likewise, James 
Tunstead Burtchaell, writing from a Catholic perspective, documented in 
detail how many religious colleges had been secularized.28 Both Marsden and 
Burtchaell wrote these works as lamentations rather than as celebrations. 
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Other scholars see more desectarianization (i.e., less emphasis being "Bap-
tist" or "Lutheran") than secularization.29 
Supreme Court decisions, particularly in the 1960s, made it clear that 
the academic study of religion in public institutions should be descriptive, 
and not prescriptive.30 The Supreme Court also indicated that academic 
study ought not be hostile to religion. Accordingly, new curricula were 
devised to teach religion as "literature."31 Questions that criticized religion 
in general or particular religions were shunned. These Supreme Court deci-
sions also saw a new effort to shift biblical studies away from historical criti-
cism, especially in high school curricula, to literary aesthetics, as another way 
to preserve the value of the text. 
So, despite the claims to neutrality, there have always been efforts that 
undermined some religious beliefs. And what is the difference today? The 
difference resides simply in which religious beliefs are favored by academics 
at any given moment. Currently, literalistic beliefs about Genesis 1 are not 
favored by academics, and so they are systematically undermined. The 
Supreme Court has often cooperated in undermining the teaching of"scien-
tific" creationism in schools, as in the case of Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), 
even though its principles may play a role in the religious belief of millions 
of Americans. 
Donald Wiebe, in a penetrating analysis of the politics of religious 
studies, notes that modern departments of religious studies and the entire 
field of academic religious studies are still dominated by what we may 
denominate as "religionists."32 Many are self-described Christians who may 
no longer advocate a hierarchical and institutional Christianity. Instead they 
may favor a more eclectic form of "spirituality," or "religious praxis" tailored 
to elite individualistic lifestyles. However, this religious orientation still 
retains the idea, no less verifiable than those of the institutional theologies, 
that religion is essentially good or should not be discarded altogether. 
At the same time, Wiebe has critiqued scholarly activism on behalf of 
religionist causes. 33 However, here I must qualify Wiebe's criticism. All 
scholars are political if "political" is understood to mean that they are 
either supporting power structures or fighting against them. Even passivity 
is a political stance. In this regard, secular humanist scholars will strive to 
assert their "right" to advocate for what their conclusions lead them to 
believe. If any scholars come to believe, on the basis of their academic 
research, that religion or specific religious traditions are harmful to 
humanity, then it follows that it is their obligation to counteract those 
beliefs. Of course, this means a nonviolent and dialogic approach, given the 
current pluralistic politics. 
This bring us to the problem of "crypto-essentialism," which refers to 
the use of essentialism while at the same time proclaiming not to do so. One 
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common example of this is found in works where undesirable elements in 
some religious traditions are characterized as "deviations." Often, the word 
"fundamentalist" is used to devalue those traditions. We shall examine some 
very specific cases in which scholars attack Western essentialism in order to 
defend the view that Islam is "essentially" peaceful, and that those commit-
ting violence in the name of Islam are not legitimate practitioners of Islam. 
The third problem in studying violence in academia is that the field of 
religious studies is still undergoing an epistemological identity crisis. We see 
this crisis discussed in books as well as in sometimes heated exchanges in the 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, among other periodicals. 34 
Among the main issues is whether the proper approach to the study of reli-
gion will entail empirico-rationalism, naturalism, or some species of episte-
mology that acknowledges the existence of the supernatural. 35 John Milbank, 
among others, sees all the social sciences themselves as a form of secular 
countertheology. 36 
Combined with these issues is the fact that many empirico-rationalists 
no longer wish to be called empirico-rationalists or positivists, but claim that 
they are practicing something else. By empirico-rationalism, I refer to the 
epistemology that affirms that only what can be verified by the five senses 
and/or logic deserves the term "knowledge," while all else is "belief." 
"Belief' is reasonable only if based on verifiable evidence and inferences. Any 
belief not based on verifiable evidence or logic is deemed irrelevant or mean-
ingless. By "naturalism," I refer to the idea that natural phenomena are the 
only things known to exist and that religion is a natural phenomenon.37 
Usually, avowed empirico-rationalists would say that historical conclu-
sions fall under the category of reasonable belief, which is any belief that, 
while not directly verified, is based on verifiable phenomena. Unreasonable 
beliefs are those that neither can be verified nor are based on verifiable phe-
nomena, and this would include God or any other supernatural entity. Thus, 
all religion has a natural basis, and is not some sort of reflection of the tran-
scendent. 
The view of empirico-rationalism as some sort of Western hegemony or 
Eurocentric invention has led to challenging the very notion of whether 
there is such a thing as religion at all.38 And even if there is such a thing as 
religion, some would hold that outsiders can never really understand any 
particular religion. 39 An alternate version of anti-empirico-rationalism 
argues that religion is a sui generis phenomenon that cannot be reduced to 
any other aspect of human behavior. Such a position has been seen as simply 
another apologetic attempt to retain the value of religion.40 
In reality, empirico-rationalism continues to be the premise for most of 
the work I see in the academy. What is different is to whom and upon whom 
empirico-rationalism is applied. Some self-described liberal Christian 
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scholars, for example, may be willing to admit that the world was not created 
in six days, as the fundamentalists believe. In this case, they have accepted the 
conclusion on nothing more than empirico-rationalist grounds, whether 
they admit it or not. On the other hand, they may hold to the existence of a 
"transcendent being" for no more verifiable reasons than the fundamentalist 
holds to creation in six days. 
And if empirico-rationalism or naturalism is held to be the proper 
approach to truth, then it becomes feasible to argue that the best way to deal 
with religious violence is to undermine religion itself. Just as we undermined 
the religious belief that Genesis 1 is historically true, we can undermine the 
belief that any religion has received instructions from a deity. Although not 
as frank as my proposal, the proposal of John J. Collins, who served as pres-
ident of the Society of Biblical Literature in 2002, urges a more activist 
stance when he concludes: "Perhaps the most constructive thing a biblical 
critic can do toward lessening the contribution of the Bible to violence in the 
world, is to show that certitude is an illusion."41 
Those academicians who believe that religion is some sort of sui generis 
phenomenon or some manifestation of actual transcendent forces that may 
be harnessed for good may, of course, have cause to argue that academia 
should strive to understand religion so that we may harvest its essentially 
good fruits. Such academics likewise should be allowed to voice such opin-
ions in a pluralistic society. 
This argument between the naturalists and the supernaturalists will not 
be settled here. And given this political impasse, the best we can do for now 
is to be frank and up-front in summarizing my own presuppositions. I am a 
secular humanist. To the extent that I have a worldview, that consists of (1) 
an empirico-rationalist approach to the definition of religion;42 (2) a para-
digm that is value laden and somatocentric when it evaluates human thought 
and action; (3) an activist orientation that not only allows, but obligates, a 
critique of religion and/or of specific religious traditions. 
To the extent that I hold certain views on what is "good" or "bad," then 
my approach is value laden, just as is the approach of anyone else. My obser-
vations, therefore, will be accepted by those who share my values. However, 
my moral judgments are also grounded in facts and reason insofar as I can 
demonstrate logical and structural parallels between actions and ideologies. 
For example, whether I regard genocide as evil or not, I can demonstrate that 
event X constitutes a case of genocide once I have defined genocide ade-
quately. Semantic logic is feasible regardless of value judgments.43 
As an academic scholar of religion, it is my responsibility to analyze how 
religion may contribute to the detriment or well-being of humanity based on 
verifiable facts and reason.44 For the same reason, in order to make any 
progress in ameliorating the problem of violence, one has to confront vio-
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lence in each religion in a frank manner. I believe I do it evenhandedly. As a 
secular humanist, I do not favor one religion over another, as I hold all of 
them to be equally based on unverifiable grounds. We argue for example, 
that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are all heavily dependent on violent 
premises. They all regard their scriptures as sacred despite the violence 
endorsed therein. 
And rather than pretend I am not hegemonic, I hold that (1) all world-
views, even those that claim pluralism, are hegemonic-for example, even 
pluralistic worldviews inevitably seek power over nonpluralistic worldviews; 
and (2) a pluralistic religious hegemony is a politically expedient means to 
persuade people to adopt a secular humanist hegemony, which I believe 
holds the best prospect for a nonviolent global society. Phrased more frankly, 
religious pluralism is good so long as it tolerates and serves the goals of sec-
ular humanism. 
AN ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 
Although we focus on how scarce resources cause religious violence, an over-
arching theme of our thesis is that the lack of verifiability in religious belief 
differentiates ethically the violence attributed to religion from the violence 
attributed to nonreligious factors. This distinction will then lead to our main 
argument, which is that religious violence is always ethically reprehensible, 
while the same cannot be said of nonreligious violence, even if we grant that 
nonreligious factors can also create a great deal of violence by making cer-
tain resources scarce. We argue that the quality of the scarcity created by 
religion is fundamentally different. 
Our argument will be framed in the form known as a fortiori argument, 
and kol wahoma in rabbinic argumentation:45 Briefly, such an argument 
attempts to show that if the truth for one claim is judged to be evident, then 
another claim ought to be held even more evidently true. As it pertains to 
our argument about religious violence as compared to secular violence, an a 
fortiori argument would be as follows: If any acts of violence caused by actual 
scarcities are judged as immoral, then acts of violence caused by resources that are 
not actually scarce should be judged as even more immoral. We further develop 
the argument that any act of violence predicated on the acquisition or loss of a non-
existent entity is always immoral and needless because bodily well-being or life is 
being traded for a nonexistent gain. 
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SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
We need not study every religion in the world to establish our thesis. While 
most religions may be prone to violence, not all religions have an equal 
impact on the quality or quantity of violence that we see in the world. Reli-
gions shared by only a few tribespeople are prone to violence as well, but 
their scale makes them relatively insignificant on the world stage. We will 
concentrate on a few of the major, so-called world religions, because they 
have produced the largest scale of violence, and present the most pressing 
problems today. We also concentrate on religions that have scriptures, as that 
contributes to the quality and quantity of violence that can arise out of those 
religions. 
On the most general level, our book is divided into four parts. Part 1 
summarizes past explanations for violence. The aim is to place our thesis 
within the context of those explanations, as well as to explain why most pre-
vious explanations have not been successful in identifying the most basic 
mechanisms of religious violence. Part 2 introduces the theoretical under-
pinnings of scarce resource theory, on which our own theory is based. We 
discuss how religion creates scarce resources, and then focus on the fol-
lowing: (1) access to the divine will, particularly through inscripturation; (2) 
sacred space; (3) group privileging; and (4) salvation. 
Part 2 also contains the main feature of our book insofar as it illustrates 
how our thesis applies in detail to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These 
traditions, combined, reportedly have more than 3 billion adherents.46 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam may indeed be viewed as sects of one older 
religious complex sometimes called the "Abrahamic" religion(s), because 
they all believe Abraham is an early and crucial worshipper of the god of 
those three religions. Abraham is believed to be a monotheist, even if the 
portrayal of his god among these three religions is not very consistent. 
The initial chapter on each religious tradition is subdivided by the scarce 
resources that we think are the most important in explaining violent mecha-
nisms. Again, these are (1) access to the divine will, particularly through 
inscripturation; (2) sacred space; (3) group privileging; and (4) salvation. Dis-
cussion of each scarce resource in each religion will be followed by illustra-
tive conflicts that can be tied to that scarce resource within the religion itself. 
Illustrated conflicts will be relatively balanced between ancient and modern 
periods to show the continuity and pervasiveness of the religious mechanisms 
for violence. Each tradition is accompanied by a chapter that explains how 
academic scholars have defended violence in that tradition. 
Part 3 examines alleged instances of secular violence. This is important 
because many scholars assume that secular violence is largely responsible for 
what appears to be religious violence. We show the religious origins of major 
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instances of violence (e.g., the Nazi Holocaust, Saint Bartholomew's Day 
Massacre), which have been attributed to secular and political forces. The 
fourth and final part synthesizes the thesis by showing how secular violence 
differs from religious violence. In addition, part 4 offers practical solutions 
and applications (e.g., foreign policy) for our theory. 
All scholarship is affected to some degree by training and experience. In 
the interest of methodological frankness, the most relevant formal training I 
have received is in anthropology and in biblical and ancient Near Eastern 
Studies. I am very centered on philology and text in order to make my argu-
ments. I provide quoted portions of texts in the primary languages when edi-
tions in the primary languages are available to me or when the arguments 
hinge on more precise linguistics. I take the challenge of ad fontes seriously. 
Relative to perhaps many other scholars, I tend to reproduce longer 
quotes and allow, as much as possible, the texts to speak for themselves in the 
same way that an ethnographer may allow informants to speak for them-
selves. I fall somewhere in between Lydia Cabrera's superb ethnographic 
work on the Yoruba of Cuba and the ruminations on minutiae found in the 
Talmud.47 As we shall see, part of the recurrent problem one finds in all fields 
is that primary sources are frequently not consulted, especially when dealing 
with claims in fields outside of our own. 
SUMMARY 
Embarking on a new explanation for a common phenomenon is a humbling 
task that requires a high degree of self-confidence. It is humbling because 
one encounters a mass of data and literature that one will never master. On 
the other hand, the very notion that one can develop any new explanation 
reflects the confidence that one can successfully tackle a problem whose solu-
tion has eluded so many others before. But that is what the challenge of 
scholarship is partly about-challenging past explanations, and waiting for 
one's peers to scrutinize, confirm, and/or dismantle a new one. I will count 
myself successful ifI have prompted scholars to think in new ways about reli-
gious violence. 
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